

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 NICOSIA 0447

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, CY, US
SUBJECT: U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES, CYPRUS

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1. INTRODUCTION

A. CYPRUS HAS CHANGED RADICALLY SINCE THE PREPARATION OF THE LAST POLICY REVIEW IN APRIL 1977. PRESIDENT MAKARIOS DIED IN AUGUST 1977, REMOVING FROM THE SCENE THE MAN WHO COULD HAVE BEST PERSUADED GREEK CYPRIOTS TO ACCEPT A REALISTIC CYPRUS SOLUTION. HIS SUCCESSOR, SPYROS KYPRIANOU, DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE THE POLITICAL POWER OR WILL TO MAKE A SIMILAR POSITIVE IMPACT. THIS NEGATIVE CHANGE ON THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE MAY HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY OFFSET BY THE ACCESSION TO POWER IN TURKEY OF PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT. HE APPEARS TO BE TOTALLY SERIOUS IN HIS DESIRE TO SOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND HAS THE REQUISITE POLITICAL AUTHORITY WITHIN TURKEY.

B. ASIDE FROM PRESERVING THE PRESENCE OF AND OUR ACCESS TO THE BRITISH SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS (SBA'S) THE U.S. HAS NO VESTED INTERESTS IN CYPRUS. HOWEVER,
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THE CORROSIVE EFFECT OF AN UNRESOLVED CYPRUS PROBLEM ON OUR GREATER INTERESTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND WITH OUR NATO ALLIES FIVES CYPRUS A GREATER IMPORTANCE THAT IT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT'S UNDERTAKING TO GET THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS RESTARTED OFFERS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE PROGRESS TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE

CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT GOAL. IF THIS EFFORT FAILS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE AN EARLY ALTERNATIVE. FAILURE OF THE ECEVIT INITIATIVE WOULD RESULT IN HARDENING OF ATTITUDES ON BOTH SIDES AND NO MOVE FROM THE STATUS QUO AND COULD MEAN UNILATERAL TURKISH CYPRIOT ACTIONS IN VAROSHA, PRESSURE AGAINST UNFICYP'S PRESENCE IN THE NORTH, OR IN THE ULTIMATE, A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. GOC REACTION TO A LACK OF PROGRESS WOULD BE TO SEEK FURTHER INTERNATIONALIZATION, INCREASED COMMUNIST AND NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT AND INCREASED CONGRESSIONAL AND U.S. PUBLIC OPINION OPPOSITION TO ANY IMPROVMENT IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH TURKEY.

2. REVIEW OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

I.A. NEGOTIATED CYPRUS SETTLEMENT BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT, BIZONAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

A. THE POSSIBILITY OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD THE MAJOR U.S. GOAL IN CYPRUS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN INTRODUCED BY PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT'S STATEMENTS OF INTENTION TO UNSYG WALDHEIM AND SECRETARY VANCE TO SUBMIT SERIOUS NEW PROPOSALS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF A CYPRUS SOLUTION. --BOTH GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS CONTINUE TO ACCEPT THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK UNDER UN SECRET

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AUSPICES AS THE APPROPRIATE MEANS OF PURSUING A SETTLEMENT. NEITHER SIDE, HOWEVER GIVES UP ITS ATTACHMENT TO ITS ALTERNATIVE, "INTERNATIONALIZATION" IN THE CASE OF THE GOC, MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO OR A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE CASE OF THE TUKISH CYPRIOTS.

--THE GOC HAS GROWN MORE RIGID UNDER PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU. HE HAS REINTRODUCED THE "LONG STRUGGLE" RHETORIC WHICH MAKARIOS HAD BEGUN TO DROP. DOMESTICALLY THIS IS THE SAFE POLICY. HE IS RELUCTANT TO FORMULATE OR ACCEPT ANY PROPOSALD UNLESS THEY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO MAKARIOS, AND HE INSISTS ABSOLUTELY ON THE PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, RETURN OF ALL REFUGEES, AND RIGHT TO PROPERTY. THE NEW ARCHBISHOP, CHRYSOSTOMOS, IS EVEN MORE UNHELPFUL.

--THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION CAN BE ACHIEVED, BUT UNDER DIRECTION FROM ECEVIT, ARE GOING THROUGH THE RIGHT MOTIONS. THEY CONCEDE THAT SOME BASIC FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND THEY ARE GRUDGINGLY PREPARING TO GIVE UP SOME TERRITORY. THEY HAVE SIGNALLED A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS VAROSHA AND THIS WILL BE CRITICAL IN PREVENTING AN AUTOMATIC GOC REJECTION OF TURKISH POSITIONS.

B. THE TWO IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES OF THE U.S. SHOULD BE TO PERSUADE THE TURKS, BOTH HERE AND IN ANKARA, THAT THEIR PROPOSALS SHOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH TO BE INTERNATIONALLY CONVINCING AS A BASIS ON WHICH TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AND, IN APRALLEL, TO DISSUADE THE GOC FROM REJECTING THEM OUT OF HAND. THE LATTER POINT NEEDS TO BE MADE IN ATHENS AS WELL, REGARDLESS OF THE GOC'S PREFERRED DISSOCIATION.

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--THE U.S. SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN ON A BASIS OF REASONABLE CONCRETE PROPOSALS, WILL NOT ENSURE SUSTAINED PROGRESS. ATTITUDES ON THE INGREDIENTS OF A SOLUTION ARE POLES APART, SUSPICIONS PROFOUND, AND LEADERSHIP LACK-LUSTER. IN MOST RESPECTS, IN FACT, THE LEADERSHIP OF BOTH CYPRIOT PARTIES PREFERS THE PRESENT SITUATION OVER CHANGE. EVEN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF AN EARLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON BROAD ASPECTS THERE WOULD BE A LONG PERIOD OF WRANGLING OVER DETAILS, HOSTILE INCIDENTS, CREATION OF TENSIONS OVER NEW ISSUES. GIVEN THE UNDERLYING DISTRUST AND ANTIPATHY, IT WILL BE HARD TO MAKE A SOLUTION, IF DEvised, FUNCTION.

--THE GOC ACCEPTS THAT THE U.S. CAN PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BUT DEFINES THAT ROLE PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF U.S. PRESSURE ON TURKEY. TO THE EXTENT WE REFRAIN FROM EXERTING SUCH PRESSURE, IN THE GOC'S VIEW, WE FOREGO OUR OBLIGATORY ROLE. RECENT SPECULATION ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS TO LIFT THE

TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO, FUELED BY THE UNFORTUNATE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS ON CYPRUS, GREECE AND TURKEY, HAVE ANGERED GREEK CYPRIOTS AND CONVINCED THEM THAT
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THE U.S. IS MANEUVERING TO RESTORE RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AT THEIR EXPENSE. THE SITUATION IS AGGRAVATED BY THE GOC PRACTICE, FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, OF ISSUING ILL-CONSIDERED PUBLIC STATEMENTS ATTACKING THE U.S. IN THE BELIEF THAT THE U.S. IS TOO BIG, UNDERSTANDING AND MANIPULABLE THROUGH CYPRUS' FRIENDS IN CONGRESS, TO RETALIATE. WE HAVE CAUTIONED GOC ON THE POTENTIAL HARM TO BILATERAL RELATIONS BUT AS THE U.S. CONTINUES ITS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, THE GOC WILL REACT EVEN MORE SHARPLY. THUS, WE FORESEE AN INCREASING TENSION IN THE U.S.-GOC RELATIONS. IN TERMS OF GREEK CYPRIOT PSYCHOLOGY, LIFTING THE EMBARGO WILL PRODUCE A GREATER FUROR THAN WOULD PASSAGE OF THE DCA.

--THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS DO NOT FORMALLY ACCEPT A U.S. ROLE IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BUT NEVERTHELESS SEEK U.S. RECOGNITION OF THEIR EQUALITY WITH THE GREEK SIDE. WHILE REALIZING THAT U.S. RECOGNITION OF "THE TURKISH FEDERATED STATE OF CYPRUS" (TFSC) IS OUT OF THE QUESTION, THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS DESIRE, AND APPRECIATE, U.S. ATTENTION AND WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH THEM. IT IS DIFFICULT, HOWEVER, TO TRANSLATE THIS INTO INFLUENCE ON SPECIFIC POLICY DECISIONS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE GOT IS THE REAL DECISION-MAKER ON MOST ISSUES.

II. A CONTINUED ACTIVE UK PRESENCE IN CYPRUS
ALTHOUGH THE OBJECTIVE OF A CONTINUED UK PRESENCE IN CYPRUS AND MAINTENANCE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE SBA'S IS MAINLY PURSUED IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON, THE MISSION ALSO WORKS CLOSELY WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS ON CYPRUS REGARDING BOTH POLICIES AND PROCEDURES. ATTACKS ON THE BRITISH PRESENCE ARE RELATIVELY MUTED AT THE MOMENT BUT CAN FLARE AT ANY TIME
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AS EVIDENCED AFTER THE CRASH OF A USAF U-2 AIRCRAFT AT AKROTIRI. AS A CYPRUS SOLUTION APPROACHES, THE ISSUE IS BOUND TO BECOME MORE PRESSING. GOC POLICY NOW IS TO SOFTPEDAL THE ISSUE. IT MAY REVISE THIS POLICY IF GREEK CYPRIOTS COME TO FEEL THAT THEIR CONCERNS IN THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATION ARE NOT SUPPORTED

BY THE WEST; IF GOC CANNOT WORK OUT AN ACCEPTABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EC; OR IF LEFTIST FORCES GAIN MORE INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVE SAID THE UK MUST LEAVE THE SBA'S IF A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT IS REACHED. WE SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT, SHOULD THERE BE A CYPRUS SOLUTION, THOSE IN THE UK WHO ADVOCATE A WITHDRAWAL MIGHT WIN THE DAY.

III. CYPRIOT SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICIES ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES

THE MISSION CAN COUNT ON A POLITE HEARING OF U.S. POSITIONS ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES BUT WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO PROMOTE A GENUINE DIALOGUE. THE GOC HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT ITS POSITIONS ON ISSUES IN MULTI-LATERAL FORUMS ARE GOVERNED BY THE NEED TO RETAIN MAXIMUM SUPPORT OF THE NONALIGNED BLOC ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE. THIS IS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE AS LONG AS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM REMAINS UNRESOLVED. NEVERTHELESS, WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE GOC UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. POSITIONS. USIS IS DEVELOPING PLANS FOR A HIGH-LEVEL SEMINAR ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES WITH EMPHASIS ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE.

3. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN

A. STATE 295604 DESCRIBES COURSES OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN PURSUIT OF ESTABLISHED U.S. GOALS. THE MISSION CONCURS IN THEM WITH THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND ADDITIONS.

B. THE CURRENT POLICY OF DIRECT U.S. APPROACHES TO
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BOTH CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES AND TO GOT IS VALID. THE U.S. SHOULD MADE A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO ASSURE THAT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE RESUMED, MAKING THE POINTS WITH TURKS AND GREEKS WHICH WE HAVE NOTED ABOVE (II.B.).

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C. AS MENTIONED, THE GOC IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE LIFTING OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO. THE U.S. SHOULD CONTINUE TO CAREFULLY EXPLAIN TO THE GOC ITS POLICY ON RELATIONSHIPS WITH TURKEY. AS A LIFTING OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO AND/OR PASSAGE OF THE TURKISH DCA APPROACHES, WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHAT MEANS MAY EXIST TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH GOC.

D. WHILE THE U.S. CANNOT FORMALLY RECOGNIZE THE TFSC, WE CAN IN A VARIETY OF WAYS HELP TO MODERATE SOME OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS' SENSE OF ISOLATION AND INADEQUACY. WE CAN SHOW THAT WE ACCEPT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY'S ADMINISTRATION OF ITS OWN AFFAIRS AND SUPPORT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRULY FEDERAL SYSTEM WILL NECESSARILY BE AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS, WHATEVER CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS EMERGE. WE WILL ENCOURAGE THEM TO HAVE GREATER CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO INTERACT WITH GREEK CYPRIOTS AS EQUALS BY ATTENDING THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS, ENSURING THAT U.S. CULTURAL AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS ARE CARRIED OUT IN THE NORTH AS WELL AS IN THE SOUTH, AND ASSISTING IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

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E. THE U.S. SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MIXED INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS. MOMENTUM ON THIS ISSUE WAS LOST WITH THE HEAVY ATTENTION GIVEN TO ECEVIT INITIATIVE AND THE GOT HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT CREATION OF A COMMITTEE IS NOT A PRIORITY. WE BELIEVE PROGRESS IN THE OVERALL NEGOTIATIONS MAY WELL BE DISCOURAGING AND THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK, NOW IN TANDEM WITH UNSYG, FOR EARLY RESOLUTION OF THIS HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM AS A DEMONSTRATION THAT THE TWO SIDES CAN WORK TOGETHER.

F. THE U.S. CAN FACILITATE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE COM-

MUNITIES. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO PARTICIPATE WITH AMERICANS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS IN THE FULBRIGHT COMMISSION AND MEMBERS OF BOTH COMMUNITIES TO MEET IN FORUMS WHERE AMERICANS ARE NOT PRESENT. THE MISSION WILL IDENTIFY MORE AREAS WHERE BILATERAL CONTACT CAN BE FOSTERED.

4. SPECIFIC ISSUES NEEDING EARLY WASHINGTON DECISION

A. SO LONG AS THE CYPRUS ISSUE IS DISRUPTIVE TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND NATO, THE MISSION WILL REQUIRE AN ACTIVE, VISIBLE USIS PROGRAM, BOTH FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTION IT CAN MAKE TO U.S. GOALS AND FOR THE UNIQUE ROLE IT PLAYS IN COMBATTING ANTI-AMERICANISM BY INFORMING PUBLIC OPINION ON THE POSITIVE VALUES OF AMERICAN SOCIETY. EMBASSY/USIS ARE PLANNING OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS SHARPLY-FOCUSSED CO-SPONSORED SEMINARS WITH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON U.S. POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES. WE ARE ALSO
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PLANNING SPECIAL LIBRARY/INFORMATION SERVICES TO KEEP SELECTED OFFICIALS AND LEADERS INFORMED OF POLICY AND DEVELOPMENTS. USIS INFORMATION AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS AND THE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY USIS ARE AMONG THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS THE MISSION HAS OF MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE TURKISH COMMUNITY AND OF ENCOURAGING BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH AND AMONG BOTH COMMUNITIES IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, LABOR, CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL FIELDS. ALL OF THESE EFFORTS WILL BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED IF A PLANNED CUT OF MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE LOCAL STAFF OCCURS AT THE END OF FY 78. THE MISSION REQUESTS THAT THE DEPARTMENT SEEK A REVIEW OF THE USIA DECISION.

B. THE U.S. AID PROGRAM (\$900 MILLION SINCE 1974) HAS CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE SOLUTION OF THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE EVENTS OF 1974. U.S. AID FUNDS ARE SPENT ON PROJECTS THAT BENEFIT BOTH COMMUNITIES AND THE PROGRAM IS ADMINISTERED WITH A REMARKEDLY LOW OVERHEAD AND WITHOUT INTERCOMMUNAL CONTROVERSY. AID FUNDS MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF BOTH COMMUNITIES, PROBABLY MORE SO TO THE GREEK SIDE WHICH RECEIVES THE LARGER SHARE AND ALMOST ALL THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENEFIT AND WHICH IS IN A BETTER POSITION TO UTILIZE THE FUNDS. WE ARE NOW AT A CROSSROADS BECAUSE, WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT A CONTINUED ASSISTANCE PROGRAM COULD HELP TO FACILITATE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THERE IS SCANT ECONOMIC OR HUMANITARIAN

JUSTIFICATION FOR LARGE AMOUNTS OF ASSISTANCE. AS A RESULT WE HAVE GIVEN CONFUSING SIGNALS TO BOTH CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES ON THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED AID. U.S. POLICY ON FUTURE AID SHOULD BE DEFINED AND THE MISSION INFORMED OF THE FINAL SHAPE OF THE FY 79 PROGRAM AND DEPARTMENT/AID PLANNING FOR FY 80

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5. DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITHIN THE MISSION

A. SOME MEMBERS OF THE MISSION BELIEVE THAT CONTINUED U.S. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO CYPRUS IS ABSOLUTELY UNJUSTIFIABLE ON ECONOMIC OR HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS AND THAT IT DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OR AMERICAN INFLUENCE. THEY ARGUE THAT CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IS A DISINCENTIVE TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN THAT IT REWARDS THE CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO.

B. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE MISSION BELIEVE THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF THE NON-ALIGNED BUT ESSENTIALLY PRO-WESTERN ATTITUDE OF CYPRUS IS SO IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS PAPER AS A MAJOR GOAL. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT RESTORATION OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH TURKEY IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE, THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT PURSUIT OF THAT INTEREST BE HANDLED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE COMMUNIST BLOC MORE OPPORTUNITIES THAT IT, DANGEROUSLY, HAS IN CYPRUS NOW.
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